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Abstract: 
Using Giddens's (1984) structuration theory, this study explored the communicative processes 
surrounding the divorce decree in coparenting relationships in stepfamilies. Participants included 
21 adults who were coparenting children in stepfamilies who completed diary entries of all 
interactions with coparents over a 2-week period, and who completed follow-up interviews. 
Results revealed two structures of signification with respect to the divorce decree that enabled 
and constrained coparenting interactions. The first signification structure was one in which the 
decree was framed as a legal document, dictating the rights and responsibilities of parenting, 
especially with respect to child access and financial issues. The second signification structure 
was one in which the decree was viewed as a negotiating guide for more informal coparental 
decision-making processes. 
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Article:  
Over the last decade, family researchers have devoted substantial efforts toward understanding 
the complexity of stepfamily relationships (Coleman, Ganong, & Fine, 2000). Nevertheless, 
researchers have stressed the need to move the research focus on stepfamilies beyond the walls 
of a single household (Braithwaite, McBride, & Schrodt, 2003; Coleman et al., 2000). 
Specifically, the quality of coparental relationships in stepfamilies is receiving increased 
attention (Braithwaite et al., 2003), given that a high degree of conflict between former spouses 
is one of the strongest detrimental influences on children and parent–child relations (Amato, 
Loomis, & Booth, 1995) and that the quality of the parental alliance affects the quality of 
parents’ nurturing and discipline (Whiteside, 1998). Thus, our interest in this study was on 
coparenting relationships in stepfamilies, defined broadly to include any parent and stepparent, 
across both households, involved in the care of the children. We considered the coparenting 
relationship to consist of both the ex-spousal subsystem and the parent–stepparent subsystem in 
the stepfamily. Throughout this article, when we refer to coparenting relationships and the 
parenting system, we are referring broadly to either and/or both of these two subsystems, and 
when we refer to parents, we are including both biological parents and stepparents. 
One of the most challenging aspects of divorce for former partners involves renegotiating power 
and intimacy boundaries (Cole & Cole, 1999; Graham, 1997, 2003; Hardesty & Ganong, in 
press), as many former spouses are in conflict throughout the divorce process (Cole & Cole, 
1999; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). Managing these challenges becomes even more tenuous in 
stepfamilies, as remarriage, for both men and women, is associated with less frequent coparental 
interaction (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992), less reported parenting support from the former 
spouse, and more negative attitudes about the other parent (Christensen & Rettig, 1995). Thus, 
developing a co-operative coparenting relationship is one of the greatest challenges facing adults 
in stepfamilies (Whiteside, 1998). 
At the same time, there is considerable evidence to suggest that both successful and 
dysfunctional coparenting relationships occur across all types of legal and residential 
arrangements (e.g., Kline, Tschann, Johnston, & Wallerstein, 1989; Maccoby & Mnookin, 
1992).As such, researchers often view the primary function of contemporary divorce law as 
providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their 
postdivorce rights and responsibilities (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). Despite this belief, 
however, we know relatively little of the ways in which divorce decrees, in general, enable and 
constrain communication processes among ex-spouses and their new partners, potentially all of 
whom are coparenting children in stepfamilies. Consequently, the primary purpose of our 
investigation is to describe the various ways in which communication among adults in 
stepfamilies structures the divorce decree as a meaningful basis for action in coparenting 
relationships. 
Communication and coparenting in stepfamilies 
Researchers investigating postmarital relationships involving children have found that a majority 
of ex-spouses maintain some form of direct contact well beyond the first year after divorce 
(Braithwaite et al., 2003; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992), though with time the frequency and 
length of such interactions tend to diminish (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). In stepfamilies, the 
postmarital relationship is further complicated by the presence of both stepchildren and new 
relational partners. For example, remarriage has been found to be negatively associated with co-
operative coparental interaction and parenting satisfaction (Ahrons & Wallisch, 1987), as well as 
continued visitation with the children (Wolchik & Fenaughty, 1996). 
To date, Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) conducted what is perhaps the most extensive 
investigation of communication and coparenting. In their longitudinal study of Californian 
postdivorce families, they identified three basic patterns of coparenting that emerged during the 
first 3 years following divorce, as well as a number of factors undermining co-operative 
coparental relationships. First, some coparents were disengaged, as they managed their 
interpersonal conflict by avoidance and made little to no effort to co-ordinate their child-rearing 
activities with each other. Other coparents were best described as being conflicted, as they 
maintained regular contact with each other, but were actively involved in conflict that spilled 
over into the parenting domain. Finally, some coparents were able to suppress, mitigate, or 
insulate their conflicts, enabling them to co-operate actively concerning the children. 
In addition to these three coparenting patterns, Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) identified a 
number of factors that undermine co-operative coparenting in postdivorce families, including 
interparental hostility, legal difficulties over custody and visitation, joint physical custody if one 
or both parents wanted sole custody, incompatible values, and a general distrust of a former 
partner’s parenting abilities. Consequently, Maccoby and Mnookin suggested that ‘the law is 
simply too crude an instrument to regulate and control day-to-day interpersonal relations; its net 
is not fine enough to deal with the sorts of everyday issues that cause difficulties in coparental 
relations’ (p. 280). Further, these researchers expressed doubt that changing divorce standards 
alone would have any influence on the way most parents allocate basic responsibilities for day-
to-day parenting, and they expressed skepticism that family law could facilitate change. There is 
little doubt that the divorce decree (i.e., the formal legal agreement that grants the divorce and 
stipulates its terms) has some influence on the communication among adults in stepfamilies, yet 
the extent to which the decree both enables and constrains the communicative agency of 
coparents in stepfamilies remains largely uninvestigated. One theory that addresses the tensions 
among structure, human agency, and change, and that is particularly useful for examining the 
intersection of macro-level institutions, such as the law, and micro-level interaction, such as 
coparenting interaction, is Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory. 
Structuration and coparenting in stepfamilies 
In order to conceptualize the interplay of tensions associated with the divorce decree and 
coparenting interactions in stepfamilies, we adopted Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory. 
Giddens’s theory begins by focusing our attention on structuration, the processes or patterns of 
behavior by which social systems are produced and reproduced through members’ use of rules 
and resources. An important distinction within structuration theory is that between system, which 
simply refers to the observable pattern of relations within a group (such as a stepfamily), and 
structure, which refers to the rules and resources members use to create and sustain the system 
(Poole, 1999). Structures can be thought of as ‘recipes’ for acting within a given social context 
(Giddens, 1984), and the relations between structure and system are represented in the concept of 
structuration (Poole, Seibold, & McPhee, 1996). 
At the heart of structuration theory is the duality of structure: Structure is both the medium and 
the outcome of the interactions that produce social systems. Giddens (1984) argued that 
structures are produced by human agency, and simultaneously, are the reproduced conditions of 
human agency. In other words, structures are the medium of action because members draw on 
structures to interact and yet they are also the outcome of action because rules and resources 
exist only by virtue of being used in interaction. According to Giddens, human social activities 
are recursive in nature, and it is only in and through their social activities that humans reproduce 
the conditions that make these activities possible in the first place. Consequently, structures both 
enable and constrain human interaction, as structural properties constituted in both rules and 
resources express forms of domination and power. Ultimately, Giddens viewed structural 
expressions of power as dialectical in nature and he offered the dialectic of control to help 
explain the two-way character of power, as the less powerful manage resources in such a way as 
to exert control over the more powerful in established power relationships. 
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of structuration theory, however, is that it examines the link 
between social institutions at the macro-level of analysis and human interaction at the micro-
level of analysis. Although family members may create certain structures that are unique to their 
own stepfamily system, more often structures are appropriated by the stepfamily from social 
institutions, such as larger political, economic, religious, or cultural institutions. This aspect of 
structuration theory is especially germane to our present inquiry, as the appropriation of the 
divorce decree from the larger legal institution may facilitate coparenting interactions in 
stepfamilies. The term appropriation refers to a process whereby family members adopt 
structural features from a particular institution and develop a situated version of them (Poole et 
al., 1996). As Poole and colleagues noted, the appropriation of structural features is a skill that 
results in different versions of institutional features being adapted to specific contexts. To 
address this process, Giddens (1984) highlighted three modalities that connect levels of human 
interaction with larger social structures and institutions. 
First, Giddens (1984) suggested that institutional features may operate as interpretive schemes in 
communication processes, referred to as structures of signification. Structures of signification 
invoke certain symbolic orders, modes of discourse, and language that ultimately are only 
understood in connection with the two remaining structures. Structures of domination refer to 
institutional features that facilitate power and influence, invoking the resource authorization 
provided by political institutions and the resource allocation afforded by economic institutions. 
Finally, institutional features may operate as norms that guide behavior and undergird judgments 
about others, referred to as structures of legitimation. Structures of legitimation invoke the 
sanctioning of certain behaviors afforded by legal and religious institutions, as well as by ethical 
standards and societal customs. It is important to note that, although Giddens identified three 
distinct structures, the distinction is largely analytical and the three elements tend to overlap in 
every action (Poole et al., 1996). 
Overall, then, structuration theory provides an appropriate theoretical lens for examining the 
various ways in which coparental communication produces and reproduces the divorce decree as 
a meaningful basis for action within the stepfamily. In general, many divorced parents are unable 
to develop co-operative coparenting relationships as they negotiate in light of previously 
established legal standards provided by the divorce decree (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).These 
challenges are further complicated by the presence of new relational partners in stepfamilies, and 
thus, the influence of the divorce decree as a structure of stepfamily interaction warrants 
investigation. In the present study, we addressed the potential influence of the divorce decree on 
coparenting relationships in stepfamilies by examining the various ways in which 
communication generates and sustains implicit structures that determine how the decree is 
interpreted and implemented. 
Method 
Participants 
The data were collected as part of a larger investigation of communication patterns among 
coparenting adults in stepfamilies across two households. We recruited participants who met the 
following criteria: First, participants must have been either a parent or a stepparent of a child 
who resided in a stepfamily household; second, (step)parents in both households must have been 
active in raising their child(ren) (i.e., children spent at least some time in each household per 
week). Guided by these two criteria, then, we sought parents and stepparents coraising children 
in stepfamilies via a convenience, snowball sample (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Given that we were asking participants to both keep a diary for 2 weeks and participate in an 
interview, we faced challenges finding those who were willing to complete the entire study. In 
the end, 21 participants (representing 18 stepfamilies) completed both parts of the data-collection 
process. Of these, 14 were female and 7 were male, with a mean age of 42 years. All but one of 
the participants were Caucasian, and that participant was Latino. Ten of the participants 
identified themselves as parents (4 females and 6 males), and eleven of the participants were 
stepparents (10 females and 1 male). In terms of education, the participants ranged from a high-
school equivalent diploma to a PhD, with 8 having earned some sort of graduate degree.The 
mean length of the stepfamilies was 6.35 years with a range from two years to 12 years. The 
number of children in the stepfamilies ranged from 1 to 6, with a mean of 2.95 children. 
Ideally, we would have preferred the participation of multiple adults from each family. However, 
in the end, four participants were a part of the same stepfamily (two separate households). In 
both cases, these participants were currently married to each other.When we inquired of other 
participants about involving other members from the same stepfamily in the study, many 
expressed reluctance about adults in the other household participating in or knowing about the 
project because it might jeopardize the delicate nature of their relationships and interactions. 
Because of ethical concerns, we honored their wishes in such cases and made no attempt to 
contact others in the family. 
Procedures 
We approached the current study from an interpretive paradigm, with the central goal of seeking 
understanding and intelligibility by focusing on similarities in meanings from the perspective of 
actors themselves (Baxter & Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 1998; Kvale, 1996; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985), looking for what Bochner (1985) described as the ‘informal logic of social life’ (p. 44). 
To meet this goal, we employed the Diary–Diary Interview method (Zimmerman & Weider, 
1977, 1983), which consists of asking participants to keep an interaction diary for a specified 
period of time and then to participate in an interview that covered both the diary entries and 
additional questions researchers wish to explore. This method has been used successfully by 
family communication researchers seeking to track family members’ interactions over a period 
of time (e.g., Leach & Braithwaite, 1996). Zimmerman and Weider (1977) argued that one goal 
of this method is to position research participants ‘as both observer and informant’ (p. 484), and 
that diaries ‘approximate observation’ in difficult-to-observe settings (such as stepfamilies) by 
providing ‘annotated chronological records’ (p. 116) of interactions. By using this method, we 
were able to collect data on participants’ interactions through 2 weeks of diary entries and 
explore meanings they placed on their interactions with adults in the other household through the 
interviews. This study emphasizes the interview data, because it provided insight into the 
meanings of the individual interaction events. 
We collected data in two phases. First, we asked participants to keep an interaction diary each 
time they interacted with the adults in the other household over a 2-week period. Because we 
were interested in both the ex-spouse or the parent–stepparent subsystems, we allowed 
participants to be either biological parents or stepparents. In each diary, participants reported 
about the interaction (who contacted whom, through what channel, the length, reason for 
interaction, and topic of interaction). For each interaction, they also reported their perceptions of 
conversational effectiveness, satisfaction, level of conflict, and overall feelings regarding the 
interaction (through semantic differential questions). The number of diary entries completed by 
each participant ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of 6.91 entries over the 2-week period. 
In the second phase of the Diary–Diary Interview method, we conducted semistructured, focused 
interviews (Spradley, 1979), allowing for the flexibility to probe for deeper understanding and to 
perception check as necessary (Kvale, 1996). Zimmerman and Weider (1977) noted that ‘the 
diary interview converts the diary – a source of data in its own right – into a question gathering 
and, hence, data-generating device’ (p. 489).We began our diary interviews by asking 
participants to expand upon the information in the interaction diary entries. Specifically, we 
asked them to reflect on whether the diary entries reflected typical patterns of interaction, and we 
asked questions that probed for more information than that provided in the diaries. Additionally, 
we asked participants about past conflicts, episodes that required planning (such as visitation and 
holidays), and other types of interactions that occurred with adults in the other household. As 
noted earlier, the data were collected as part of a larger investigation on communication and 
coparenting in stepfamilies, and thus, we had not singled out the divorce decree in our interview 
guide; rather, this structure emerged as a central topic in participants’ discourse concerning 
coparenting and their stepfamily experiences. The interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes each and 
yielded 391 pages of single-spaced interview transcripts for analysis, in addition to the diary 
entries.The fact that we did not a priori expect that the divorce decree would emerge as an 
important construct, and that we did not specifically ask about it, makes it even more noteworthy 
that it achieved such a central place in our findings. 
Data analysis 
We approached data analysis with theoretical sensitivity, which Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
conceptualized as approaching data with an ‘open mind’ but not an ‘empty head’ (p. 47). In other 
words, we did not force the data into categories, but we were aware of the major concepts of 
structuration theory when analyzing these data. The data analysis process was completed in 
several steps. First, the researchers individually read through the transcripts holistically several 
times and met to discuss the identified themes. Second, the researchers read through the 
transcripts, specifically noting structures that emerged. Third, three of the researchers used the 
inductive process of analytic coding (Lindlof, 1995) to compare data for similarity and 
differences.When a given datum was perceived to be different from prior data, a new category 
was added, and the process was repeated until no new categories were required. The researchers 
then shared their categories and discussed similarities and differences among their derived 
categories, including exemplars of the different categories in their analysis. Next, one researcher 
took the analyses, found connections among them, and refined the categories and chose 
exemplars for the final research report. Finally, all five of the researchers analyzed these results 
critically to check the team’s analysis and to confirm that the exemplars accurately represented 
the findings. 
Results 
Participants evidenced two structures of signification with respect to the divorce decree. 
Structures of signification, as Giddens (1984) conceives them, are interpretive schemes or 
‘recipes’ that provide rules and resources for communicative action. The first signification 
structure was one in which the divorce decree was framed as a legal document.The second 
signification structure was one in which the divorce decree was viewed as a negotiating guide or 
backdrop for more informal coparental decision making. In turn, structures of legitimation and 
domination were interwoven with these two signification structures. 
The divorce decree as legal contract 
The signification structure of divorce decree as legal contract was predicated on the belief that 
coparenting actions were matters of law, dictating absolutely the rights and responsibilities of 
parenting, especially with respect to child access (e.g., custody and visitation rules) and financial 
issues related to the children (e.g., support payments, college savings funds). Sanctioning against 
violations was enacted by parental use of the court system as a primary resource. Illustrative of 
the legal-contract scheme is a statement from a stepmother, married to a father who does not 
have primary custody of the children from a former marriage. The stepmother indicated to the 
interviewer that the divorce decree ‘loom[s] into our lives’ (#21, 425):1 
We pick them up from school 2 days a week, and they’re with us until about 10 pm. But 
they spend every weeknight at their mother’s house. And then we have them every other 
week-end . . . There’s this sort of rigid pattern of child-sharing . . . She basically has the 
kids for the traditional holidays at the traditional times, and this is something my husband 
resents. Ya know, like Thanksgiving, she’ll have the kids for dinner but we might see 
them in the morning or something. Christmas, she has the kids on Christmas Eve and 
Christmas morning, but they’ll come to our house around 2 o’clock. So we tend to see 
them on all major holidays . . . but not at the times when family traditions are usually 
taking place. (#21, 164–167, 405–421) 
In this excerpt, the stepmother is describing the access rules that determine when she and her 
husband have visitation rights. Apparently, her husband is not pleased with these rules of access, 
particularly surrounding holiday time, yet this pair feels legally constrained by them. 
Financial support was the other primary domain in which the legal-contract structure was 
reported. One nonresidential father described, in part, how financial arrangements were 
determined by the legal contract of the divorce decree:  
Well, it is explicit in the divorce decree. That has helped a lot. So, for example, she takes 
care of the health insurance because the kids get a tuition exchange, a tuition remission. I 
take a tax deduction for the kids as they come of age, and there is also an item agreement 
that we will split all unusual costs . . .We really haven’t argued about that [financial 
matters] . . .The agreement itself is pretty explicit. (#9, 143–194) 
In this excerpt, the children’s father is sharing with the interviewer that there are explicit item 
agreements in the divorce decree that determine coparenting financial responsibilities. Unlike the 
stepmother quoted earlier, this parent felt positively about the explicitness of the divorce decree. 
These positive and negative reactions toward the divorce decree as a legal contract are important 
markers of Giddens’s (1984) observation that structures function both as enablements and as 
constraints. 
The legal contract as enablement. For some stepfamilies, the divorce decree as legal contract 
facilitated smooth functioning in the coparenting system of both biological/adoptive parents and 
their respective new partners. For these coparenting systems, the legal-contract structure 
provided a depersonalized and tightly regulated set of rules for parenting, thereby alleviating 
parental disagreements, disputes, and conflict. One stepmother, who lives in a household with a 
father and his son from a former marriage, shared with us her belief in the court system, the 
institutional mechanism by which the legal contract is determined, as a way to resolve ongoing 
conflicts about child support between her husband and his former spouse: 
The best way to go about it was to just go through the courts because that eliminates all 
these threats and all of that verbal stuff that goes on when there’s a lot of anger and 
frustration. So he [her husband] just went to court, got a court order, then they went again 
to a court-ordered mediation. At the mediation, she agreed to sign a contract, which was a 
legal contract, and she just had to make her [payments]. (#4, 135–139) 
In this same coparenting system, the stepmother and her husband strategically relied on e-mail 
rather than face-to-face exchanges with the former spouse: ‘We choose to use e-mail because 
then we can get a point across and not have her hang up on us or anything, or get upset and swear 
at us . . . Plus then we have it in writing, and when we have to go to court, which we frequently 
do, then, it’s all in writing. So, it’s just a protection for us’ (#4, 96–122). For this stepmother, the 
divorce decree as legal contract was viewed as a set of legally binding rules that limited ongoing 
conflict between parents. When parents were bound by the contract, they reasoned, it was not 
subject to dispute. Should one parent violate the contract, the court system functioned as the 
primary resource through which compliance was achieved. 
Other members of stepfamilies shared the view that the legal-contract structure functioned 
positively in the coparenting system by limiting conflict. One nonresidential father summarized 
how the legal contract enabled functional communication between the two parenting households: 
‘I think that in many cases the rules are there so they work best when the individuals are not 
speaking. The rules become explicit and people can say, “Look, this is what it says and here is 
when I am going to come so get out of my life”’ (#9, 500–508).  
The legal contract structure provided a resource to prevent, or resolve, conflicts between 
coparents. In turning to the language of the contract, a coparenting household could close down 
efforts by the other household to disagree with, or challenge, parental rights. 
Within the signification structure of a legal contract, the divorce decree was perceived to have 
the advantage of clarity in articulating parental rights and responsibilities. However, such clarity 
and predetermination were a double edged sword. 
Legal contract as constraint. Many coparents reported that the legal contract lacked flexibility 
for the needs of parents and children alike. When a coparent was perceived as unwilling to 
negotiate an exception in response to changing circumstances, the divorce decree was perceived 
as a resource of domination, used by him or her to control the other coparent’s access to the child 
or the particulars of their financial support. One residential stepmother (P) of a teenaged stepson 
provided the following account (to an interviewer, I) of how the nonresidential mother was 
perceived to use the language of the decree as a structure of domination: 
P: We were scheduled to go on vacation. And, the vacation fell over the week-end that 
John [the stepson] was to see his mother, and she had agreed to switch with us. We had 
given her time with John prior to our vacation. A snowstorm hit and we didn’t go on 
vacation, ’cause we were driving. So we didn’t go, and I said, ‘Well then call your 
mother and have her come up, and you need to go be with your mom,’ and he refused 
because he didn’t want to go see his mother. And I didn’t probably insist that he go, I just 
thought ‘OK, he doesn’t want to, fine.’ It wasn’t any big thing . . . every time he goes 
from one place to another he’s living two different ways and he just wanted to chill out 
for a week. He just wanted to be where he was, do what he wanted, and not have to 
conform to our ways or her ways. Anyways, she found out that we were chilling out 
rather than on vacation, and so, she took us to court, for contempt. Yeah, because of the 
fact that it was her week-end even though we had already given up our week-end at a 
previous time. 
I: So, she had already had the substitute week-end, but since this was still supposed to be 
the official week-end . . .  
P: Right, and it was a court order and there was no way that we could prove that she 
previously, even though the child and the father said that she had already had this week-
end, the judge said, ‘No, it isn’t a matter of people getting to pick and choose. This is a 
court order, you obey it.’ And then [the father] told [the mother], ‘You really put me in a 
difficult position, and you’re walking on real thin ice.’ ’cause it really isn’t contempt. I 
mean it’s not like somebody was deliberately trying to break a court order. But, the law is 
the law. (#4, 498–527) 
In this unexpected circumstance, the stepmother thought it was acceptable for her stepson to stay, 
especially given that she and her husband had been true to the spirit of the decree by trading 
week-ends. However, the mother was upset by the act of ‘contempt’ of the divorce decree, and 
she used the court system, and the clarity of the divorce decree contract, as a way to sanction her 
former husband. The boy’s father thought the mother’s behavior was clearly inappropriate, but 
‘the law’ was not on his side. Interestingly, the stepmother and her husband were apparently not 
upset with the judge; rather, their anger was directed at the mother, who was perceived to have 
taken unfair advantage of the stipulations of the decree. Whether ill-intentioned or not, the 
mother’s agency in suing her ex for contempt functioned as a structure of domination in 
controlling compliance with the court order. 
Sometimes, the constraint was reciprocal, as each coparenting household used, or threatened to 
use, the legal contract of the divorce decree as a structure of domination against the other. 
Illustrative of such reciprocal attempts at control was this account provided by a residential 
father, divorced for 14 years. At the time this episode transpired, their son was living with his 
mother: 
She [his ex-wife] mentioned that they were looking at moving to Kansas City. And I said 
that I was going to fight that and take it to court. And she’d have to take it to court to get 
him [their son] out of state anyway, so, um, I was going to fight for custody and try to get 
him back. And I ended up talking to [his ex-wife’s current husband] in the process, and it 
just came down to a, ‘Well, if I, if we want to do it, we’ll end up doing it and you’ll end 
up losing.’ And, I didn’t back off to where I said, ‘Well, that’s OK, you can have him.’ I 
kept stating that I was going to fight it and push it, partly knowing that . . . just hoping 
that she would back off, I guess, ’cause I didn’t know whether I had the financial 
resources to try to do that anyway, and I probably would end up losing him. (#6, 424–
433) 
Although constraint often was experienced as a structure of domination situated in the efforts of 
the other coparent to use the divorce decree as a weapon, constraint was often attributed directly 
to the decree itself and the court system that legitimated it. For example, a nonresidential father 
described how he attempted to use the court system to control his ex-wife’s abuse of the decree’s 
stipulations, but the story takes an interesting turn, ending with the judge and the decree 
functioning as a structure of domination over both parents: 
Maybe I should tell you about how I had to go to court. [My ex] sees Christmas as when 
her extended family celebrates it. They celebrate Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and 
sometimes the day after. Our decree says that one year she has them for Christmas Day 
and one year I have them for Christmas Day. This is my year to have them for Christmas 
Day, and I said, ‘Let’s figure out a time.’ It would be 8 or 9 in the morning to 8 or 9 at 
night. Well, she e-mailed me and said Christmas is when her family celebrates Christmas 
so you will get them the 27th. So I went to court to get them on Christmas Day. What 
was even sillier was the judge’s decision. He agreed that I should have them on 
Christmas Day – midnight until midnight – and next year with midnight to midnight, I 
said [to the ex], ‘You know, this is stupid. Let’s just do 8 o’clock to 9. They are just 
going to be sleeping [at midnight]’ . . . so we finally agreed to that. (#8, 798–846) 
This father initially used the legal-contract structure as a resource to change his access to the 
children at Christmas time, but the language of the judge’s ruling (midnight to midnight) was 
overly rigid and proved to be an unreasonable constraint on parents and children alike. So the 
parents were able to construct an alternative structure that worked better for them. They used the 
legal contract as a guideline against which they negotiated an alternative access rule, abandoning 
the literal language and mandate of the legal document.  
This father’s story is a typical one in our interviews. When the domination structure was the 
divorce decree itself, rather than the other coparent’s use of that decree, coparents were 
motivated to transform the meaning of the divorce decree from a legal contract to a different 
signification structure – one we label a guide. In this alternative signification structure, coparents 
did not use the decree as a legally binding contract. Instead, it was a backdrop or framework for 
negotiation in which partners were free to alter the stipulations of the decree if they could 
informally agree on an acceptable course of action. 
The divorce decree as a guide 
In the guide structure, legitimation hinged not on following the letter of the divorce decree but on 
good faith efforts to maintain the principle of fairness with the interests of the children first and 
foremost. A stepmother discussed these principles as a legitimation structure for the guide 
scheme, and why she and her fellow coparents preferred it over the legal contract mentality: 
We need to work it out, because otherwise there will be a lot of hostility, there will be a 
lot of anger, and if we work things out as we go, things down the road are gonna be 
easier. If we don’t work things out, the more stuff that we say, ‘nope, we can’t reach a 
compromise, just go by the decree,’ the more things down the road are going to get more 
and more like that and it’s just gonna be this snowball effect that is just gonna make 
things worse and worse as we go along. So, we all kinda have the same opinion that if we 
try to work things through the best we can, and try to be civil, then everybody benefits. 
The children benefit the most, and the adults benefit too, because then they’re not, ya 
know, feeling like they’re not getting their way, or they’re being discriminated against or 
whatever . . . it just benefits everybody involved. (#3, 534–552) 
These coparents appeared to endorse the spirit of co-operation directed at the children’s interests, 
viewing the legal contract structure as adversarial, and thus ultimately counterproductive. 
Another parent, a nonresidential father, described the fairness principle of the guide structure in 
terms of how their daughter was to divide time between households for the holidays. Plans were 
unsettled because of travel on the part of both parents: 
What I think is going to happen is I am going to talk to [my ex-wife] and tell her the 
situation, check with her to see if or when she is going to Philadelphia and then try out 
the possibility that we could have her for Thanksgiving this year. See if there is 
something in return we could give her for that . . .You sort of bargain, but bargain makes 
it sound too formal. I am asking for something, so I am willing to give something up to 
what works for her as well. (#15, 515–529) 
This father talked about bargaining, not in a formalized, legally bound way, but in the spirit of 
good faith. 
The guide as enablement. Coparents often exercised agency to suspend the legally binding 
constraint of the divorce decree when they found the language of the decree too rigid and 
inflexible in response to their needs. When coparents were able to liberate themselves from the 
contract, their coparenting system was often functional, enabling responsiveness to everyone’s 
needs. A residential mother reported that she and her ex suspended the legally determined access 
rule, because it often did not work for the father’s schedule: 
We are supposed to rotate holidays and stuff like that, but it doesn’t always work for him. 
If it is my holiday and he wants them, what I generally do is, I visit with the kids to see if 
it is OK with them and say I know it is mine, but he wants you. Do you care if you go? 
That is how we generally work it out, through the kids. (#2, 185–188) 
When it came to financial arrangements, however, the legal-contract structure still prevailed: 
We had to go back to court ’cause he [her ex] was trying to modify the support. That is 
pretty touchy. You know, he doesn’t see them on a regular basis, he doesn’t go out of his 
way to buy them things or call them on their birthdays or anything. In my eyes, if he 
could walk away from paying support he would. This is just how selfish he is. (#2, 332–
338) 
This mother and father suspended the legal-contract structure in favor of a guide structure, but 
only on a situation-by-situation basis. Thus, the signification structure of this family, like others 
in our sample, was a mixture of both legal contract and guide, depending on the issue at hand. 
This mixture of both legal contract and guide is illustrated by the following excerpt from a 
stepmother whose household has custody of the children 40% of the time. When asked how she 
went about trying to balance competing household needs or wants for child access, she said: 
Well, by being sensitive to the fact that [my husband] would have liked [his sons] to stay 
and also being aware that [the mother] wants them over there. Just trying to be aware of 
what the legal arrangements are, but then also what is the right thing to do. And trying to 
initiate what is right without having a fight . . . Once I realized that we [herself and the 
mother] were going to be cordial with each other, things just got more relaxed . . . Except 
for all the custody arrangements, but that is their divorce and that is their deal. The kids 
are all ours, all of our responsibility. (#10, 255–262, 454–457, emphasis added) 
This stepmother indicated that the 60–40 custody split was honored to the letter of the law, but 
within that parameter, the coparenting system consisting of the biological parents and the 
stepparents tried to function informally by responding to what the children needed. Her reference 
to ‘their’ versus ‘our’ marked the clear demarcation between the contract and guide 
significations. Thus, on such matters as homework, curfew enforcement, and household chores, 
the four parents worked as a single, co-ordinated team on behalf of the children’s best interests. 
The issue of custody was bracketed out of the domain of the contract signification. 
Children functioned with increasing agency in reaction to the legal-contract structure, especially 
when they reached adolescence. Further, many parents were willing to shift to a guide structure 
in response to the expressed wishes of their children, especially when children reached 
adolescence. Illustrative of this shift is this account provided by a nonresidential father of a 
teenager:  
[The daughter] lived half time in each household for a number of years: 6. As she got 
older she increasingly wanted to live in one household and just visit the other one. So she 
decided to live at her mom’s household and we were trying to come up with some way to 
do this that would be OK with [the daughter] and OK with me. It would keep me active 
in parenting her. Part of that arrangement was that [the mother] and I would have 
monthly meetings face to face so we could talk about issues that came up and plans and 
strategies and so forth. (#15, 108–114) 
Although the father preferred the half-time access he was granted by the divorce decree, he and 
his ex-wife negotiated a new way to sustain his parenting role, involving less time with the 
daughter and more time in discussion and decision making with the mother. This change was 
motivated by a mutual desire to be responsive to their child’s wishes to suspend the stipulations 
of the divorce decree. 
A minority of coparenting systems had relied solely on the divorce decree as a guide. Coparents 
reported that relations were co-operative and good faith had always prevailed in co-ordinating 
parenting issues. One nonresidential father, divorced for 5 years, invoked the metaphor of how a 
business is run to describe the coparenting system: 
It feels kind of like a business . . . The children are kind of our business together and I 
can respect that [other] person . . . Anybody can always pick up the phone and 
communicate about the girls and what’s happening. Our daughters come and go as they 
please. They are welcome to stay any week-end anywhere or during the week. They get 
to make those choices. (#14, 614–617) 
In the coparenting ‘business,’ the coparents are not friends but business partners. As such, they 
form a business-like team whose purpose is to raise the children. The teenagers have an active 
voice in determining parental access.  
Many adults in coparenting systems realized that the informality of the guide structure could 
function to constrain or limit positive coparent relations. Thus the guide structure, like the legal 
contract, functioned as both enablement and constraint. 
The guide as constraint. One disadvantage of the guide structure was that it created the 
opportunity for coparents to abuse good-faith principles. Such violations functioned as structures 
of domination, as one coparent was perceived to control the situation in favor of his or her own 
individual interests. One important way bad faith could be displayed was in attempts to 
manipulate or use the child. One mother discussed with the interviewer her former husband’s 
pattern of attempting to lengthen his time with their children:  
Like they would stay one day longer and he would call and say, ‘I talked to the kids and 
they want to stay two days longer. So we’re going to stay two days longer.’ And what I 
knew that he did was to the kids he would say, ‘Oh, I miss you so much please stay a day 
longer’ and they would feel bad for him and they would say, ‘Yes’ and not honor their 
true feelings. So, I had to be strong. And actually [the daughter] has told me many times 
that she never wants the parenting schedule to change. Like we would go to my son’s 
concerts at school and he would, the kids would be with me, and he would say to [my 
daughter], ‘I miss you so much. Why don’t you just come home with me and I’ll take you 
to school tomorrow?’ And that would put so much pressure on her. She would actually 
get sick and say to me, ‘Mom, I’m going to throw up or something.’ (#23, 225–288) 
Once the mother perceived that her ex was manipulating the children in order to gain more 
access to them, she refused to negotiate flexibility in the decreed access rule. In short, she 
perceived a violation of the good-faith spirit of the guide structure, and resorted back to a legal-
contract structure as a resource to protect her children. 
When the good faith negotiations of the guide structure malfunctioned, for whatever reason, 
coparenting systems often moved back to the legal contract structure. A stepmother spoke of 
how the coparenting system worked when they were unable to reach agreement about how to 
handle the holidays:  
At that point, it’s basically up to whatever the decree says. We usually try to 
accommodate what the people want for holidays, ya know, ‘cause when you’ve got other 
family members to get together with the children and stuff you really try to make it work. 
And there have been times in the past where my husband hasn’t wanted to give them up 
on Christmas Eve to accommodate her schedule because then we’re not able to take them 
to Christmas Eve service at our church with us . . . so he will just flat out say, ‘We can’t 
reach an agreement. I want them on my day, and we can’t come up with a compromise so 
we’re just gonna have to go with what the decree says.’ But, ya know, that’s very, very 
rare . . . (#3, 69–89) 
Sometimes, the guide structure was perceived to work because there was conscious awareness of 
the option to resort to the legal-contract structure should informal negotiations fail. A residential 
stepfather provided this account of why he thought the nonresidential father was so co-operative 
in their informal guide with respect to financial support: 
He pays his child support and I think the reason he does that, between you and me and 
the gatepost, is he don’t [sic] want her going back to court to get more . . . If the doctor 
bills get a little high or something, he’ll chip in extra. Or like the girls now are playing 
instruments, and they are not cheap. He will kick in a little bit on those and we get along 
fine. We have no problems. (#11, 70–75) 
To this stepfather, the nonresidential father provided extra, voluntary financial support in a fair 
manner. However, he attributed such generosity not to the father’s sense of what was fair but to 
the possibility that he would be taken back to court. The legal-contract structure thus functioned 
as a latent threat to enable informal co-operation between coparents. 
Discussion 
In this study, we used a multifaceted methodological approach, the Diary–Diary Interview 
method, framed within Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory to further our understanding of 
communication processes among coparents in stepfamilies. When we interviewed participants 
regarding their diary records of coparenting interactions across households, we were struck by 
how salient the divorce decree was as a structure that guided these interactions. Although legal 
scholars have written about the legal aspects related to the divorce decree, we know of no studies 
that have examined how this document structures communication among coparents in 
stepfamilies, both in terms of facilitating it and hindering it, and in turn, how communication 
produces and reproduces the meaning of the divorce decree. An additional contribution of our 
study is that we examined communicative processes and structures across the households 
represented, not just within the confines of a single home. 
In general, we found two primary ways that the divorce decree structured, and was structured by, 
coparenting interactions. First, the divorce decree was considered by some of our participants to 
be a legal document that dictated each parent’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the 
children. As a legally binding document, this structure served as an absolute mandate regarding 
appropriate and inappropriate parenting behavior. Among the participants in our sample, the 
divorce decree either facilitated coparental communication because it provided an objective 
standard for parental behavior, or it hindered coparental co-operation because it was used 
inflexibly and rigidly by one parent to exert control over the other.  
The second way that the divorce decree functioned as a structure for these families was as a 
guide. In such instances, the divorce decree served as a structure that provided some guidance, 
but was not rigidly adhered to in every detail. Typically, the divorce-decree-as-guide structure 
worked effectively to foster co-operation among coparents, but, at times, one coparent was 
perceived as taking advantage of the other’s good-faith efforts. Deviating from the tenets of the 
divorce decree requires considerable mutual trust, because there is no institutional enforcement 
mechanism when coparents choose to find their own solutions to childrearing issues. When one 
parent perceived that this trust was violated, there was often a return to the structure of the 
divorce decree as a legal document to resolve disputes. Thus, even when the divorce decree was 
used as a guide, the parents’ realization that the legal structure of the divorce decree was 
available either helped them to negotiate flexibly in good faith or it provided a legal resolution to 
parenting disputes if one parent perceived that the other was taking advantage of the other’s good 
will. Our results support Maccoby and Mnookin’s (1992) observation that the law is too ‘crude’ 
to govern daily human interaction, and therefore cannot replace the human tendency to work out 
problems in mutually acceptable ways, even if these deviate from the divorce decree. 
Our results are suggestive of three possible types of coparenting teams in these data, categorized 
according to how the divorce decree was structured: (a) Guide-emphasis coparenting teams, the 
least common in our sample, were able to function positively and collaboratively, and thus, used 
the divorce decree as a guide, not as a legally binding legal contract; (b) legal contract-emphasis 
coparenting teams attempted to remain true to the legal stipulations embedded in the divorce 
decree, either finding some comfort in the structure provided by the decree and/or feeling the 
need to follow the decree rigidly even though it constrained positive coparental interactions; and 
(c) mixed coparenting teams, the most common category in our sample, who used the decree as 
both contract and guide, depending on their perceptions of whether the other party was 
coparenting fairly and flexibly. When both parents perceived that the other was functioning in 
good faith, they were able to use the decree as a guide only, but, when the parties were perceived 
as being unfair or rigid, at least one party felt the need to resort to using the decree as a contract. 
These tentatively identified coparenting types bear some similarity to the typology derived by 
Maccoby and Mnookin (1992). Our guide-emphasis coparents resemble Maccoby and 
Mnookin’s co-operative coparents, who are able to transcend their conflicts to work 
collaboratively to raise their children. Our legal contract-emphasis coparents appear similar to 
Maccoby and Mnookin’s disengaged coparents, who function in parallel, avoid each other, and 
perhaps rely on the divorce decree as a contractual structure to guide their interactions. Finally, 
our mixed coparents have some commonalities with Maccoby and Mnookin’s conflicted 
coparents, who are actively engaged with each other, but who have periodic conflicts that affect 
their parenting. We speculate that such parents may feel the need to resort to the divorce decree 
as a legal structure during these conflictual episodes. Because these two classification schemes 
have the potential to enrich each other, we hope that future research will explore the 
correspondence between them. 
Our results provide support for the utility of applying Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory to 
the stepfamily context (Krone, Schrodt, & Kirby, 2006). In fact, using structuration theory as a 
conceptual framework helped us identify salient aspects of how the divorce decree is used in 
stepfamilies, such as directing us to explore how the divorce decree as a structure both facilitates 
and hinders communication between coparents. Because the divorce decree is developed in 
conjunction with the judicial system, structuration theory’s emphasis on how people appropriate 
structures from social institutions was particularly helpful. In addition, our findings exemplify 
several features of structuration theory. 
First, as Giddens (1984) argued, structures of signification, domination, and legitimation are 
interwoven in complex ways in stepfamilies, such that at different times, and perhaps even at the 
same time, the divorce decree serves as a societal symbol of the divorce settlement, a means of 
exerting power over another member of the coparenting system, and a set of socially (and 
legally) sanctioned norms to guide coparenting behaviors in stepfamilies. Our data clearly 
revealed that the divorce decree serves each of these purposes in sometimes separate and 
sometimes integrated ways. Second, Giddens suggested that there is a recursive relationship 
between human interaction and structures, such that the interactions among individuals affect the 
development of a signification structure, and, in turn, the signification structure influences 
interactions. Our results illustrated that the coparents, as well as the larger social institutions 
involved in the divorce process, determined the nature of the divorce decree. In turn, the divorce 
decree then influenced, as either a guide, a legal contract, or both, the coparenting interactions in 
the stepfamily system. In addition, given that the divorce decree can and often is modified by 
court order (through motions to modify the decree), the reciprocal nature of the interaction–
structure relationship becomes even more salient when the decree is legally modified over time. 
Finally, structuration theory emphasizes the importance of both human agency and structure, 
indicating that the course of human interaction is determined by a complex interplay between 
individuals who are proactively creating and using structures to guide their behavior and the 
developed structures, in turn, influencing individuals’ behavior. In the present study, we found 
numerous examples of how these coparents found creative (and agentic) ways to co-operatively 
coparent their children, sometimes bending or even deliberately violating the tenets of the 
divorce decree because they did not need to follow it. In turn, the structure of the divorce decree 
provided a foundation that either guided or dictated coparents’ childrearing behavior. Coparents 
in this study were by no means passive recipients or followers of the dictates of the divorce 
decree; they actively created and recreated (and even changed through the motion to modify 
process) the divorce decree through creative and purposeful activity. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Our study has several limitations that suggest directions for future research. First, with one 
exception, we examined the perspective of only one member of the coparent team. Thus, we can 
make no claims about how the other coparents view the divorce decree and how it is used. We 
recommend that future research gathers the perspectives of multiple parents in the coparenting 
system. Second, we only gathered the perspectives of parents and not children. It would be 
interesting to determine the extent to which children are aware of the divorce decree, and believe 
that it influences interactions in their families. Third, and related to the second limitation, we 
were not able to examine how the use of the divorce decree is related to the age of the children. 
Because children spend more time with their friends and are more autonomous as they become 
older, we suspect that coparents will feel more pressure to use the divorce decree as a guide as 
their children age.  
Fourth, even though diary data were gathered over a 2-week period, our interview data are 
basically cross-sectional. Consequently, we can only speculate about changes over time in how 
coparents use the divorce decree as a structure that influences their interactions. For example, we 
propose that couples in the early stages of their divorce may find it necessary to use the divorce 
decree as a legal contract and that, in some couples, there may be an increase in the use of the 
divorce decree as a guide over time. Fifth, because we did not initiate the original project with 
the goal of exploring the divorce decree, there is a considerable amount of information related to 
the divorce decree that we did not collect. For example, we suspect that the amount of conflict 
involved in negotiations surrounding the divorce settlement would influence how the divorce 
decree structures later coparenting interactions. Those parents who had more disagreements in 
negotiating the terms of the divorce may be less able to use the divorce decree as a guide, rather 
than as a legal contract. In future research, we recommend that this issue, as well as others 
related to the divorce settlement process, be examined. 
Finally, the divorce decree involves individuals and institutions beyond the family. For example, 
lawyers, mediators, judges, and counselors all may play a role in the process of how the divorce 
decree is developed and how it is later used to guide coparenting interactions. We recommend 
that future researchers ask parents about how these other constituencies influence how the 
divorce decree affects their coparenting behavior, as well as interview members of these outside 
institutions regarding their impressions of how the divorce decree serves as a legal or guiding 
structure. 
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